Fooling a Real Car with Adversarial Traffic Signs by Morgulis, Nir et al.
1 
 
Fooling a Real Car with Adversarial Traffic Signs 
Nir Morgulis, Alexander Kreines, Shachar Mendelowitz, Yuval Weisglass 
Harman International, Automotive Security Business Unit 
  
Abstract 
The attacks on the neural-network-based classifiers using adversarial images have gained a lot of 
attention recently. An adversary can purposely generate an image that is indistinguishable from 
a “good” image for a human being but is misclassified by the neural networks. The adversarial 
images do not need to be tuned to a particular architecture of the classifier – an image that fools 
one network can fool another one with a certain success rate. 
The published works mostly concentrate on the use of modified image files for attacks against the 
classifiers trained on the model databases. Although there exists a general understanding that 
such attacks can be carried in the real world as well, the works considering the real-world attacks 
are scarce. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no reports on the attacks 
against real production-grade image classification systems. 
In our work we present a robust pipeline for reproducible production of adversarial traffic signs 
that can fool a wide range of classifiers, both open-source and production-grade in the real world. 
The efficiency of the attacks was checked both with the neural-network-based classifiers and 
legacy computer vision systems. Most of the attacks have been performed in the black-box mode: 
the adversarial signs produced for a particular classifier were used to attack a variety of other 
classifiers. The efficiency was confirmed in drive-by experiments with a production-grade traffic 
sign recognition systems of a real car. 
 
1 Introduction  
Front facing camera modules can be found in almost any modern vehicle, used in variety of tasks such as 
traffic lane assist [1–3], traffic sign recognition (TSR) [4–7], and object detection [8–11]. As we move on 
towards autonomous vehicles, the vision systems of the vehicle will need to do more complicated tasks 
and will take a big part in the decision making and path planning of the vehicle [12,13]. One of the enablers 
of this technological leap is the rapid progress of Machine Learning algorithms for computer vision [14].   
The use of computer vision algorithms based on neural networks introduces a new type of vulnerability 
into the system. By creating intentional weak perturbations that get strong response in the output of the 
classifier, an attacker can produce malicious images or objects that can fool such systems [15,16].  Such 
attacks can be either based on the knowledge of the architecture of the attacked network (white-box 
approach [17–20]) or be completely architecture-independent (black-box approach [21–24] ). The white-
box attacks are understandably stronger than black-box. There are publications that show that detection 
and segmentation networks are also vulnerable [20,25,26].   
In several recent studies, there were attempts to create real-world objects that when perceived through 
a camera, can fool a trained classifier. Athalye et al. [27] developed the Expectation over Transformation 
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(EOT) algorithm and used it to print 3D objects that can fool a classifier when observed from a variety of 
viewing angles. 
Another notable example of a successful real-world physical attack (Deceiving Autonomous caRs with 
Toxic Signs, DARTS) can be found in the work done by Sitawarin et al. [28]. They have demonstrated a 
successful physical adversarial attack on real-sized traffic signs. They created a pipeline for upscaling 
adversarial perturbation to a printable size, and used the real-size printed signs to fool a classifier that 
gets a video feed from the viewing angle of a front-facing camera in a real vehicle.  
1.1 Contribution 
Our work shows how to utilize adversarial attacks to attack real-life systems in the physical world. Our 
research goal was to understand whether commercial TSR systems installed in vehicles could be 
susceptible to adversarial traffic signs in realistic real-world scenarios. This is the first time that a 
successful physical adversarial attack on a commercial classification system has been demonstrated. 
 We have extended the adversarial creation pipeline proposed by Sitawarin et al. [28] with 
improved random augmentation techniques and the ability to create perturbations which are 
tailored to speed limit traffic signs and are therefore less perceptible to a human viewer.  
 We have created a pipeline that allows robust production and evaluation of printing-size 
adversarial signs in the black-box mode. 
 We proved that adversarial signs produced by our proposed technique can fool a commercial car 
perception system in a consistent manner in real-world driving conditions. 
2 Background 
2.1 Adversarial Attacks 
When attacking a classifier  𝑓: 𝑋 → 𝑌 , a function that maps images from domain 𝑋 into labels from 
domain 𝑌, the attacker takes an image 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 , and uses it to derive an adversarial image ?̃?, usually by 
adding a small (and ideally imperceptible)  perturbation to the original image: ?̃? =  𝑥 +  𝜀. When such an 
attack is successful the adversarial image will produce a different classifier output than the source image 
that it was created from 𝑓(𝑥) ≠ 𝑓(?̃?).  
Adversarial attacks can be performed in the white-box setting – where the attacker has full access to the 
attacked classifier 𝑓: to its architecture, its parameters (𝜃) and its outputs. Black-box setting is a scenario 
where the attacker has no access to the attacked classifier. A black-box attack is naturally a more 
challenging task for the attacker, who needs to design his attacks in an indirect manner. A common black-
box attack technique [22–24] is to rely on the adversarial transferability phenomenon – it was found that 
adversarial images that can fool a certain classifier in white-box setting, may remain adversarial when 
targeting a different classifier in black-box setting. An example for a simple and efficient attack method is 
the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), proposed by Goodfellow et al. [29]. In the proposed method the 
attacker computes an adversarial perturbation by calculating the gradient of a loss function 𝐿𝑓 w.r.t the 
pixels of a given image, model parameters 𝜃 and the correct image label 𝑦. The problem is linearized by 
performing a single iteration of fixed size determined by a small scalar 𝜀0 in the sign direction of the 
gradient: 
𝜀 =  𝜀0𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (∇𝐿𝑓(𝜃, 𝑥, 𝑦)) (1)  
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For targeted attacks, one can simply calculate the loss w.r.t a selected target ?̃? and then perform a single 
iteration towards the desired minima: 
𝜀 =  −𝜀0𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (∇𝐿𝑓(𝜃, 𝑥, ?̃?)) (2) 
This method requires only a single iteration and therefore it is very efficient. A defender can include it in 
the training process of his system to improve its robustness against such attacks. This method of defense 
is called adversarial training. There are several additional variants of the FGSM methods with improved 
results [30,31]. 
Following the early work on adversarial images, researches have published their work on defense 
techniques, looking for ways to harden the protected classifier and improve its robustness to such attacks 
[32–36]. The proposed defenses showed promising results when defending against most attack 
techniques. 
Carlini and Wagner [17] Have proposed a new attack technique that produced very strong adversarial 
samples that were able to break all previously published defenses,  we refer to their attack as “CW 
attacks”. They have formulated the problem of finding a successful targeted adversarial attack as an 
optimization problem: 
Min   𝑑(𝑥 ̃,  𝑥)      𝑆. 𝑇  𝑓(𝑥 ̃) = ?̃? ,      ?̃?  ∈  𝐻 (3) 
Where 𝑑 is a distance function (typically a p norm), 𝐻 is the constraint on the target space, The classifier 
𝑓 is a highly non-convex function and the optimization problem cannot be solved directly. The authors 
have proposed to solve an optimization problem with a surrogate loss function ?̃? (defined in (4, 5)). 𝑐 is a 
constant used to balance the tradeoff between the perceptibility of the attack and its effectivity in fooling 
the classifier. 
Min   𝑑(𝑥 ̃,  𝑥) + 𝑐?̃?(𝜃, ?̃?, ?̃?), 𝑆. 𝑇  ?̃?  ∈  𝐻 (4) 
?̃?(𝜃, ?̃?, 𝑇) = max(max{𝑧(?̃?)𝑖 ∶ 𝑖 ≠ ?̃?} − 𝑧(?̃?)?̃?, −𝑘) (5) 
 
Where 𝑧(?̃?)𝑖 refers to the logit for class 𝑖, and 𝑘 is a constant that can be used to control the desired 
confidence in the target class. It can also be referred to as an “overshoot” parameter. 
The goal of the constraint  𝐻 is to ensure that the optimization output is a valid image 𝑥 ̃ ∈ [0, 1]𝑛 (𝑛 is 
the image dimensions). It can be done by clipping the coordinates after each iteration, or by clipping into 
the objective function 𝑓(min(max(?̃?, 0) , 1)). Instead of simply clipping the output, the authors have 
chosen to use the following change of variables and optimize with respect to the new 
variable 𝜔:
 𝜀 =  
1
2
(tanh(𝜔) + 1) − 𝑥 (6) 
Since −1 ≤  tanh(𝜔) ≤ 1 , than: 0 ≤ 𝑥 +  𝜀 ≤ 1 so ?̃? should always have a valid value. This approach 
smoothens the gradient decent and prevents it from getting stuck in extreme regions. 
The CW attack proved to be a very effective approach to produce adversarial images and it is considered 
to be a very strong attack technique [16]. Carlini and Wagner have demonstrated that using their attack 
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technique as a basis, an attacker can defeat many types of defense methods [37]. It is also shown that the 
computed perturbations can affect different architectures and therefore can be used in black-box 
scenarios as well [16,17] with better transfer efficiency than other attack techniques such as FGSM. 
2.2 Expectation over Transformation (EOT) 
The task of performing a successful adversarial attack over real-world classifiers can be challenging. It was 
found that adversarial images might lose their effectivity when subjected to minor transformations [38]. 
When an adversarial object is placed in a real-world environment, it can be viewed from variety of angles 
with different lighting conditions. A successful attack needs to survive all those transformations some of 
which can be quite aggressive. The challenging nature of this task led some researchers to the conclusion 
that physical adversarial attacks are not feasible and should not be considered as a threat [39] 
To face the challenge of performing adversarial attacks in the physical world Athalye et al. have proposed 
the Expectation Over Transformations (EOT) [27] method.  
The main idea of their approach is that instead of optimizing a perturbation over a single image, the 
attacker chooses a distribution 𝑇 of transformation functions 𝑡(𝑥), that he wants his adversarial images 
to be robust against and introduces the transformed images in both the loss function and the distance 
between the initial and transformed images. He then calculates the mathematical expectation of both 
loss function and distance. The resulting optimization problem can be written as follows: 
𝔼𝑡~𝑇[𝑑(𝑡(?̃?), 𝑡(𝑥))] <  𝜀0, (7) 
min 𝔼𝑡~𝑇[𝐿𝑓(𝜃, 𝑡(?̃?), ?̃?) ] 
The authors demonstrated that with a choice of T distribution which includes realistic space distortions 
involved in printing out a 2D image of a 3D object, it is possible to produce an adversarial object that can 
fool a classifier when viewed from a range of viewing angles and distances. 
2.3 DARTS Pipeline 
In  [28], the authors built the following pipeline to tackle the challenge of producing printable physical 
adversarial traffic signs in the real world dimensions: 
1. Take a high-resolution image of a traffic sign 𝑥𝐻𝑅.  
2. Generate a mask 𝑀 which includes only the sign.  
3. Re-size both 𝑀 and 𝑥𝐻𝑅 to the input size of the attacked classifier. 
4. Produce an adversarial image ?̃? w.r.t a given target ?̃? and resized downscaled 𝑥, while spending 
the perturbation budget, calculated as the 𝑝 norm of the perturbation, only on pixels which are 
within downscaled 𝑀. 
5. Re-size the perturbation 𝜀𝐻𝑅 =  ?̃? − 𝑥 to the original 𝑥𝐻𝑅 dimensions. 
6. The high resolution adversarial image would be ?̃?𝐻𝑅 =  𝑥𝐻𝑅 +  𝜀𝐻𝑅 
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Figure 1: Pipeline for the creation of high resolution adversarial traffic signs with the following stages:  a) generate mask, b) 
resize image and mask into classifier input dimensions, c) generate adversarial image, d) resize the perturbation and add to 
the original image. 
For the production of a robust adversarial image ?̃? the authors created a variant of a CW attack combined 
with EOT: 
argmin
𝜀
  𝑐 
1
𝐵
∑[
𝐵
𝑖=0
?̃?(𝜃, 𝑡𝑖(𝑥 +  𝑀 ∙ 𝜀), ?̃?)] +  max (‖𝜀‖𝑝, 𝜀𝑚𝑖𝑛) (8) 
Where ?̃? is the surrogate loss function from equation (5) as defined by Carlini and Wagner [17], 𝐵 is the 
number of pre-defined transformations in domain 𝑇 where 𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝑇. Transformation space 𝑇  contains 
combinations of random image warping and brightness augmentations. The perturbation 𝜀 is applied only 
to the area defined by the mask 𝑀, the distance function used is a p norm over 𝜀. The authors added a 
hyper parameter 𝜀𝑚𝑖𝑛 to control the minimal perturbations that get penalized. Such a parameter is 
needed since perturbations which are too small might not survive the transformation to the dimensions 
of the original, high resolution sign. 
2.4 Datasets and Classifiers 
In order to generate the adversarial images that will later be used for the real-world attack, we first trained 
two classifiers with Multi-Scale Convolutional Network [7] based architecture, one with the input size of 
32x32 pixels, the other with the input size of 128x128 pixels. For training and validating these classifiers, 
we used the GTSRB [6] dataset which contains more than 50k images of German traffic signs in 43 
categories. Our research is focused on the creation of adversarial speed signs since most of the current 
commercial systems available cannot recognize other types of traffic signs. We used a GTSRB subset which 
contains only speed signs, in 8 speed categories (11,400 images for training, 1380 for validation, and 4170 
for test). We resized all images to uniform dimensions, we had two size variants of the subset – 32X32X3, 
and 128X128X3.  
We were able to achieve 98% accuracy for the 32 pixels classifier, and 98.5% accuracy for the 128 pixels 
classifier (over the speed signs sub-set). 
To verify attack transferability in black-box scenario, we used a classifier with Dense Net [40] based 
architecture, which was trained on 32 pixel size input. This classier achieves 99.6% accuracy on the speed 
signs subset. 
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To create the high quality adversarial speed signs we used an auxiliary data set with 25 high resolution 
(spanning in the range of 500-2500 pixels) printing templates of traffic speed signs that we have 
collected/created. All classifiers have 100% accuracy on the auxiliary dataset. 
3 Expanding the Adversarial Production Pipeline 
Our main research question was to understand if a physical adversarial traffic sign can fool a commercial 
TSR system in a realistic scenario. Sitawarin et al. [28] have showed promising results, and we have 
decided to use their proposed adversarial production pipeline as the basis for our research. The goal was 
to increase the chances that the adversarial speed signs produced by the pipeline will work in real-world 
attacks, and to reduce the perceptibility of the perturbation. 
3.1 Random Transformations Sampling 
The chosen transformations space in the EOT method has a strong effect on the resulting adversarial 
attack robustness in the real-world conditions. Sitawarin et al. [28] used a random combination of: 
perspective transformations, brightness adjustments, and image resizing which are predefined before the 
optimization process begins. 
For Brightness transformations, Sitawarin et al. have used a common augmentation practice of adding a 
single random value to all RGB channels. The main downside of this approach is that such linear 
transformations are not a good representation of what happens when the lighting conditions are changed 
in the real world. We wanted to achieve brightness adjustments which better represent the lighting 
conditions encountered when deploying the adversarial signs outdoors. We converted the images to the 
YUV color space and used a random value to scale the Y channel which represents brightness. After the 
augmentation was done, the image was transformed back to RGB for the rest of the pipeline. Scaling the 
Y channel is a better representation of the physical brightness shift phenomena compared to a general 
scale of the RGB channels. Another benefit of our approach is that it adds another non-linearity into the 
transformation space. 
One of the hyper parameters in DARTS pipeline is the number of random transformations 𝐵 which are 
generated in transformation space 𝑇. The authors found that as a general rule of thumb, when adding 
more variations of transformation the resulting adversarial images are more robust. The number 𝐵 also 
determines the batch size of the optimization process, so the tradeoff for increasing the amount of 
transformations is increased computation power and time. 
We took a different approach: instead of determining a constant set of random transformations at the 
beginning of the optimization process, we generate a batch of new random transformations at each 
iteration. 
 
argmin
𝜀
  𝑐 
1
𝐵
∑ [𝐵𝑖=0 ?̃?(𝜃, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝑥 +  𝑀 ∙ 𝜀), ?̃?)] +  max (‖𝜀‖𝑝, 𝜀𝑚𝑖𝑛),   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: (9) 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 = 𝑇(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒), 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝑚), 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝑅𝑆𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒)) 
Where transformation space 𝑇 is now function that generates image transformation functions w.r.t  𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 
– brightness scaling factor, 𝑚 – a 3X3 projection transform matrix, and 𝑅𝑆𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 – a resize scaling factor. 
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Our approach of continuous randomization of the transformation space effectively increases the number 
of different transformations used in the image generation. When iterating 3000 steps, the effective 
number of different transformations would be 3000 * 𝐵. This allowed us to significantly reduce the value 
of B; we found that using 𝐵 values in the range of 32 – 256 gave similar output results. Using small batch 
size of 32 significantly reduced the computation time needed for robust adversarial sign creation.   
3.2 Domain Specific Perturbations 
When creating an adversarial image, the choice of hyper parameters is usually done as a trade-off 
between attack effectivity and perturbation perceptibility.  
In the optimization problem presented in equations (9), the tradeoff can be controlled with the hyper 
parameters  𝑐 (loss function weight), 𝜀𝑚𝑖𝑛 (minimal perturbation), 𝑘 (overshoot parameter), and the 
choice of 𝑝 norm used to penalize the perturbation. When tuning the hyper parameters, we found that in 
order to make an adversarial traffic sign that can survive the entire pipeline and successfully fool a 
classifier after being resized and printed, we need to use relatively aggressive perturbations.  
While the attack efficiency can be directly measured by the classification error, measuring the 
perturbation perceptibility is not straightforward. With a lack of formal definition for perceptibility, the 
usual approach is to estimate it by measuring the 𝑝 norm of the perturbation (usually a choice of 𝐿1, 
𝐿2 or 𝐿∞). Such norms do not directly represent the actual perceptibility of the distortion to a human 
viewer. Drastic shifts in the color space can be immediately spotted, for example: a small red circle on a 
white background will be prominent to a human viewer compared to a similar circle in a shade of light 
gray that might be imperceptible for a human. On the other hand, in the RGB color space the red circle 
(that appears only in a single channel) can have a lower 𝐿2 score than a small circle in a shade of gray (that 
perturbed all 3 channels). 
Our work is focused on the speed limit signs, which is a domain with a very limited number of features – 
typically consists of black digits over a white background. Any perturbation which introduces new types 
of features into the traffic signs such as new types of colors might immediately appear as out of 
distribution and perhaps as human intervention.  
We added a term to the loss function that encourages perturbations to be in a valid color space for the 
speed signs domain. We have defined the valid color space as shades of gray. The additional element 
measures the deviation of the perturbation from the grayscale (grayscale loss term) marked as 𝐿𝑔𝑠 and is 
added to the general loss function with a scalar weight 𝑐𝑔𝑠: 
argmin
𝜀
  𝑐 
1
𝐵
∑ [
𝐵
𝑖=0
?̃?(𝜃, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝑥 +  𝑀 ∙ 𝜀), ?̃?)] +  max (‖𝜀‖𝑝, 𝜀𝑚𝑖𝑛) +  𝑐𝑔𝑠 ∙ 𝐿𝑔𝑠 (10) 
Grayscale color space is relatively simple to constrain in the RGB color space. We defined the grayscale 
loss term as a penalty for differences between the channels of the perturbation, normalized by the image 
dimensions 𝐻 and 𝑊. 
𝐿𝑔𝑠 =
1
2𝐻𝑊
∑‖𝜀[: , : ,0] −  𝜀[: , : , 𝑖]‖2
2
𝑖=1
(11) 
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Figure 2: Examples of the perturbations created when different penalties are used. All signs are targeted to be classified as 30 
km/h and were created with equivalent hyper parameters 
In Figure 2 we demonstrate the typical outcomes one might expect when using each of the perturbation 
penalty policy. It can be seen that our approach produced perturbations that can naturally blend in the 
image and perhaps be perceived as natural wear or sun damage. 
The new hyper parameter 𝑐𝑔𝑠 controls the strength of the grayscale enforcement. In practice we found 
that the best results are obtained when the grayscale perturbations are set as hard condition, so we chose 
a value of 𝑐𝑔𝑠 ≫ 𝑐 in most of the cases. 
3.3 TV In the Loop  
When creating adversarial images with optimization-based techniques such as CW attacks, the adversarial 
creation process can be quite slow (1-4 minutes per image), and the optimal hyper parameters can be 
different at each sample. The creation of a significant amount of spoofed signs even in a white-box 
scenario can become a slow process requiring human inputs. 
Our target was to fool a commercial classifier installed in a vehicle in real-world conditions, meaning that 
we had no access to the weights or logits of the classifier, and had no knowledge of the classifier 
architecture; only the final classification output was visible. Our attack approach was to use our own 
classifier in order to generate the adversarial signs in the white-box mode, and then test the effect of the 
signs on a different classifier in the black-box mode, expecting a certain yield on account of attack 
transferability between the classifiers. 
Fooling a black-box classifier in real-world conditions as we defined added many uncertainties into the 
process and thus our expectations on the yield of transferable attacks was very low (our first estimation 
was <5%). The attack hyper parameters needed to be tuned in a way that maximizes transferability while 
minimizing the perturbation intensity and perceptibility by a human.  
The adversarial production pipeline that was used can indeed create print-sized adversarial signs, but the 
process is not scalable enough for a successful black-box scenario. The low expected attack transferability 
yield requires printing a large amount of adversarial traffic signs in order to find the successful signs which 
can fool the TSR system installed in a car. Tuning the hyper parameters can become a very slow and 
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expensive process. And that is in addition to the logistic challenge of handling potentially hundreds of 
real-size traffic sign printouts. 
We had a practical goal of minimizing the amount of traffic signs that are printed in the attempts to find 
the successful ones. We added another step into the pipeline in order to better estimate whether a certain 
attack will survive the transfer into the physical domain. 
3.3.1 Experimental setup 
In order to evaluate the transferability of printed adversarial attacks in black-box scenarios, we added a 
step where we are simulating the transfer. After tuning the attack hyper parameters over a large batch of 
traffic signs, the signs were projected on a TV screen. The screen was positioned at angles 𝜃 and 𝜑 in 
relation to a camera located in the distance 𝑑 away from it (as described in Figure 3) and at the same 
height.  
 
Figure 3: The schematic representation of the TV in the loop experimental setup 
In order to simulate different imaging conditions, every batch of adversarial signs was taken from a range 
of positioning combination where: −45° ≤ 𝜃 ≤  45°, 0° ≤ 𝜑 ≤  15° and 7𝑚 ≤ 𝑑 ≤  15𝑚. 
At every viewing position, two images were taken for each adversarial traffic sign in the batch: one image 
of the adversarial sign, and an image of the original traffic sign (clean sign) that was used to produce the 
adversarial attack.  
The resulting images were classified by a classifier that was different from the one used for the image 
generation thus simulating the black-box attack on the real car TSR. Ideally, we should have used a real 
production-grade TSR for this purpose but it can only be used when the car is in motion; this is not realistic 
for the TV-in-the-loop setup. 
3.3.2 Results 
The data collected was used to evaluate the adversarial signs produced after each iteration of tuning the 
hyper parameter. The physical adversarial success rate (PASR) was evaluated in the following manner (A 
similar metric was used in [41]): 
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𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑅 =
∑ ((𝑓𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑖(?̃?)) ≠ 𝑦) & (𝑓𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑖(𝑥)) = 𝑦))  
𝑁
𝑖=0
∑ (𝑓𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑖(𝑥)) = 𝑦) 
𝑁
𝑖=0
 (12) 
Where 𝑁 is the number of viewing angles used to grab the sign images, 𝑡𝑖 is the physical transformation 
of the image as perceived from each viewing angle, and 𝑓𝐵𝐵( ) is a black-box classifier. At some extreme 
viewing angles the classifier failed to properly classify clean original images of the traffic signs. In order to 
isolate only the cases of successful adversarial attacks and discard cases where the classifier made an 
unrelated error, the PASR metric takes into account only viewing angles where the original sign is properly 
classified. Figure 44 demonstrate a PASR calculation of a single adversarial speed sign. 
 
Figure 4: An example of an adversarial sign cropped from images taken at 28 different viewing angles. Title of each image 
describes the classifier prediction for adversarial and clean versions of the sign. The PASR score of this adversarial sign is 
0.96. The  original printable version of the traffic sign is on the top left. 
The “TV in the loop” method was used to evaluate with a PASR metric a large number of adversarial signs 
that were produced with variety of hyper parameters. Our assumption was that adversarial attacks which 
are able to generalize into another black-box classifier after physical augmentations, will have a higher 
chance of fooling the TSR system installed in the vehicle than adversarial attacks which have failed the 
tests.  
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Figure 5: PASR score distribution across multiple hyper parameter sets. 
Our hyper parameter tuning tactic was to select several combinations of hyper parameters that worked 
well on selected images, and apply them to all possible combinations of targeted attacks (source 50 km/h 
with target 100 km/h for example), resulting in a batch of 100-200 adversarial images for each hyper 
parameter set. 
Figure 55 describes the distribution of PASR scores across different sets of hyper parameters. The PASR 
score was used to filter out the adversarial signs which had low chance for black-box generalization.  
The “TV in the loop” approach allowed us to scale up the adversarial production process, and evaluate 
approx. 1500 adversarial traffic signs that were produced with different hyper parameters (selected in a 
grid approach) as one batch. We used a threshold of PASR > 0.9 in order to create a subset of approx. 100 
adversarial traffic signs which will go to manual evaluation before printing. 
We found that there isn’t a single set of hyper parameters that can produce the best adversarial images, 
as each sign that was targeted have reacted differently when attacked. The final subset selected for the 
field experiment contained adversarial traffic sign images that were created with a variety of hyper 
parameters. 
4 Field Experiment 
4.1 Experimental Setup 
The real-world drive-by experiments were performed at the Smart Mobility Analysis and Research Test 
(SMART) Range in the Negev desert near Beer-Sheva. The SMART Range is a non-profit organization whose 
aim is building and operation of an Automotive Cyber Security center for the smart mobility solutions in 
Israel. It is founded by the leading automotive industrial companies and related private Israeli companies, 
Ben Gurion University of the Negev, and the city of Beer Sheva. The bird’s eye view of the SMART  Range 
track is presented in Figure 6. 
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Figure 7: The bird’s eye view on the test field  
The “TV in the loop” pipeline have narrowed down the number of potential successful adversarial signs 
to a few dozen which have reasonable chance to generalize well in real-world black-box scenario.  
We manually narrowed down the list to a final subset of adversarial signs that were printed in real size 
and positioned around the test field. Our selection was done according the following criteria 
 High PASR score 
 Perturbation perceptibility – we selected signs with a range of perturbation intensities for our 
evaluation. We found that the L1 or L2 norms of the perturbations did not reflect the actual 
attack perceptibility well enough, so a manual evaluation was done as well. 
A sample from the final dataset can be seen in Figure 87. 
13 
 
 
a)  
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
e) 
 
f) 
 
Figure 8: A sample from the adversarial signs that were tested on the test field. Each sign has its own adversarial target  ?̃? =
 : a) 120 km/h, b) 60 km/h, c) 50 km/h, d) 30 km/h, e) 60 km/h, f) 80 km/h 
A combination of spoofed and clean signs were positioned around the track, and were perceived by the 
TSR system of a car that was driving around the track. The output of the TSR system was recorded from 
the CANBUS of the vehicle. In addition, since we had no access to the video feed used by the TSR module, 
we recorded a video of the drive with a dash camera and used it for monitoring and evaluation. 
4.2 Results 
Our experiment was the first time that a commercial TSR module is tested with adversarial traffic signs in 
such a manner. We have identified that the TSR system may react to an adversarial sign in one of the four 
following ways: 
1. Sign is properly identified with the original source label 𝑦 (attack failure) 
2. Sign is identified with the target label ?̃? (attack success) 
3. No reaction from the TSR system (attack failure) 
4. TSR system freezes for ~1 minute (attack success) 
Since only the final output of the TSR system is available, the attack success is evaluated in a binary manner 
– success or failure. In reaction number 3, we chose to define it as an attack failure because ignoring 
adversarial traffic signs is actually a valid approach in dealing with such attacks. Reaction number 4 was 
unexpected, it can be considered as a DOS attack on the TSR module. Without any access to the TSR 
pipeline we cannot understand the root cause of this behavior, but since it creates a strong disruption of 
the module operation, we consider this type of reaction as a successful attack. 
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Figure 9: Adversarial traffic sign on the test track, as seen from a dashboard camera installed on the vehicle 
A combination of adversarial and clean traffic signs were positioned along the track, and we drove the car 
for several laps at different speeds (range of 30 – 70 km/h), different positions along the lane, and 
different lighting conditions as the experiment was performed over several hours during the day. A typical 
frame of the video recorded during the experiments is presented in Figure 9. The banner in the upper part 
of the frame shows the sequential pictures of the sign recorded by our camera. 
  
Figure 10: Summary of the different reactions of the vehicle TSR system when encountered with the adversarial traffic signs on 
multiple laps. 
Figure 1Figure 10 shows that around 40% of the adversarial signs that have passed our proposed pipeline 
and were selected to be printed were able to fool the vehicle’s TSR system in a complete black-box 
scenario: no access to classifier weights or architecture, and no knowledge of the classifiers input pipeline. 
The successful adversarial traffic signs were able to do it in a very consistent manner on the test field and 
reproduced the TSR behavior in almost every lap. 
5 Related Work 
Sitawarin et al. [28] have proposed a pipeline for the creation of real-sized adversarial traffic signs. The 
authors have showed that images taken of printed adversarial traffic signs produced by their pipeline can 
fool a classifier. Our work can be considered as an expansion to the DARTS pipeline. 
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The authors of [26,41,42] have showed that they can create physical stop signs that after being printed, 
can successfully fool classification networks in a white-box scenario. Attacks on detection networks (YOLO 
v2 and Faster RCNN) were demonstrated as well.  
Zhang et al. [43] have created a pipeline for creation of adversarial vehicle paint patterns that can fool 
detection algorithms. The authors have created the attacks and showed their effectivity in a simulation 
environment. Even though the attacks remained in the simulation domain and were not demonstrated in 
the real world, the work is still notable. The proposed technique of using a simulator with high quality 
graphics for the creation realistic attack transformations seems very promising. 
A research group from Tencent Keen security lab [44] performed a comprehensive study of reverse 
engineering for finding security flaws in a Tesla. Among other things, they found weaknesses in the 
perception systems of the vehicle. They were able to trigger the auto wipers by projecting noise on an 
electronic display placed in front of the vehicle, thus fooling the visual sensor of the system. They also 
investigated the lane detection system: it was demonstrated that after application of aggressive blur to a 
traffic lane the perception system might not detect it, and a fake lane might be produced by placing certain 
stickers on the road (the latter was not demonstrated yet in real driving conditions). 
6 Summary  
In this study we have presented what to our knowledge is the first time that an adversarial object is used 
to fool a commercial classification system in a real-world scenario. Our proposed pipeline includes physical 
transformations as an augmentation method, and domain specific perturbation which reduce the attack 
visibility. We showed that our pipeline can be used to reproducibly manufacture a significant amount of 
high resolution adversarial speed signs which transfer to other black-box classifiers in a robust manner. 
We did an experiment on a test track where we showed that printed adversarial traffic signs produced by 
our pipeline can fool the TSR system installed on the vehicle in a consistent manner. 
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Appendix Hyper Parameter Tuning 
The choice of hyper parameters proved to be a challenging task. We found that the optimal choice of 
hyper parameters is not always clear, and different images react differently to similar parameter values. 
In this appendix we describe some of our observations regarding the effects of different hyper parameter 
choices and the values (or ranges of values) that were used to produce different adversarial traffic signs 
that were produced in this research. 
The attack algorithm used inside our pipeline is based on the CW attack algorithm as described in (9). 
There are several hyper parameters that need to be selected: 
𝑐 – The ratio between the loss function and the perturbation penalty. This parameter controls the trade-
off between attack strength and the perturbation perceptibility. The usual range that we have used was 
2.0 – 15.0. 
𝐵 – Batch size, which also represents the number of transformations from the transformation domain 𝑇 
used at each iteration. Affects the calculation time and the robustness of the produced adversarial image 
to distortions when viewed in the real world. We found that our proposed technique of constant 
randomization produced similar robustness qualities in a range of values, so we chose to use a constant 
batch size of 32 on all of our tests. 
𝑘 – Overshoot parameter  (5) defining a trade-off between attack strength and perturbation perceptibility, 
it is also affected by the choice of the value of parameter 𝑐.  Typical values that we used were in the range 
of 5.0 – 50.0. 
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𝑝 norm – The choice of norm penalty controls the nature of produced perturbation. The choice of 𝑝 = 1 
norm usually results in sparse but strong perturbations, while a choice of 𝑝 = 2 will result in smooth 
perturbation that are spread over larger areas. We have decided to use 𝑝 = 2 in our tests since we found 
that, when combined with the promotion of grayscale perturbations, it can produce perturbations which 
can be perceived as natural decay. 
𝜀𝑚𝑖𝑛 – Minimal perturbation. Perturbation smaller than this value will not get penalized. This parameter 
is needed, because very small perturbations might disappear when resized to the high resolution 
dimensions of the original image. We typically chose values in the range of 1.0 - 5.0 when using L2 penalty 
function (𝑝 = 2). 
 
𝑐𝑔𝑠 – In (10) we introduce a new term of the loss function, which encourages the perturbations to be in 
shades of gray (the color distribution of the speed signs domain). We found that we get the best result 
when we set it to very large values (𝑐𝑔𝑠 ≫ 𝑐), practically setting the grayscale perturbation color space as 
a hard constrain. 
Image resolution – we attacked two classifiers, trained with different input resolutions: 32 and 128 pixels. 
The idea was that perturbations produced on a higher resolution image would have better chance to scale 
up to the full size of the original image. We did not observe a strong evidence that adversarial images 
produced in higher resolution generalized better with the black-box commercial classifier. Our final 
printed set had adversarial traffic signs produced in both methods. However it is worth noting that when 
the 128 pixels classifier was used as a black-box to test transferability of adversarial signs produced by the 
32 pixel classifier, it was robust to almost 100% of the attacks. When the reverse test was done, we found 
that attacks on 128 pixels classifier transferred well and were able to fool the 32 pixels classifier. 
 
 
